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ABSTRACT 
This Article provides the first major analysis of the very recent 
en banc decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit in the now famous Therasense v. Becton 
Dickinson. The doctrinal issue central to the case is inequitable 
conduct, a judicially created doctrine developed to punish patent 
applicants who behave inappropriately during patent prosecution, 
the ex parte process of patent creation. The core thesis of this 
Article is that Therasense could have a much more significant, 
complex, and nuanced impact on the legal infrastructure of 
American innovation than the opinion for the court appears to 
appreciate. In view of these complexities, the court may be too 
sanguine in its expectations for the instrumental effect of its 
decision, a decision that has the potential to erode some of the 
core pillars upon which the legal infrastructure of American 
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The purpose of this Article is to provide an early analysis 
of some of the most substantial law and policy concerns raised by 
the very recent en banc decision of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit in the now-famous Therasense v. 
Becton Dickinson case.1  The doctrinal issue central to the case is 
inequitable conduct, a judicially created doctrine developed to 
punish patent applicants who behave inappropriately during patent 
prosecution, the ex parte process of patent creation. 
The core thesis of this Article is that Therasense could have 
a much more significant, complex, and nuanced impact on the 
legal infrastructure of American innovation than the opinion for 
the court appears to appreciate. In view of these complexities, the 
court may be too sanguine in its expectations for the instrumental 
effect of its decision. More specifically, there are few reasons to be 
confident that the new doctrinal regime imposed by Therasense is 
well crafted to remedy any putative problems encouraged by the 
old law. Moreover, there is much reason to believe that the new 
doctrine could aggravate existing problems with the patent system 
and establish new ones. In sum, this is a decision that holds the 
potential to erode the legal infrastructure of American innovation.   
To enhance understanding of the concerns developed in the 
analysis, the first Part of this Article provides a background that 
explains the innovation context and history of the case and 
describes the relevant legal dispute. The second Part of this Article 
is devoted to an early analysis of substantial innovation law and 
policy concerns raised by the decision of the court. We finish with 
a brief third Part, in which we consider what the Therasense case 




United States Patent No. 5,820,551, the patent at the heart 
of Therasense v. Becton Dickinson, had its origins in a United 
Kingdom laboratory in the early 1980s.2 There, a team of 
pioneering scientists came together to develop a groundbreaking 
way for diabetes patients to monitor their blood glucose levels—a 
                                                
1 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
2 U.S. Patent No. 5,820,551 (filed June 6, 1995). Background information comes 
from Therasense, 649 F.3d 1276; Therasense, Inc. v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 
593 F.3d 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (rehearing en banc granted, opinion vacated); 
and Therasense, Inc. v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 565 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (N.D. 
Cal. 2008).  
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crucial advance in the treatment of diabetes, a disease whose 
growth rate over the past few decades has reached epidemic 
proportions. To give a sense of the magnitude of the epidemic, 
government statistics show that in 1980, 5.6 million Americans 
were diagnosed with the difficult-to-manage and potentially 
debilitating disease;3 by 2010, that number had climbed to a 
startling 18.8 million Americans (with another 7.0 million believed 
to be undiagnosed).4 
The device developed by these scientists was simple and 
elegant. It began with the creation of an improved sensor coated 
with biochemical compounds that produced a tiny flow of 
electricity in the presence of glucose, an invention that led to 
patent number 4,545,382 in the United States and patent number 
EP 0 078 636 in Europe. The scientists next placed the new sensor 
on a test strip that could be inserted into a meter to produce a 
digital readout of the blood glucose level and then thrown out.5 
This innovation made it possible for anyone to test their blood 
glucose at any time, leading to a revolution in diabetes patient 
care.6 
As with the sensor invention, the scientists sought a patent 
for the disposable test strip. However, unlike the patent application 
directed to the glucose sensor—the one that gave rise to the '382 
patent—the patent application directed to the disposable test strip 
was repeatedly rejected by the patent office.7 The rejection of the 
scientists’ claims was based, perhaps ironically, on the earlier 
invention of the '382 patent.8 Medisense, the assignee of the patent 
application and the company commercializing the test strips, 
repeatedly sought to overcome the rejections, amending the 
proposed claims and submitting declarations to distinguish the 
prior art or tout the commercial success of its disposable test 
strips.9 For fourteen years, these attempts failed to sway the 
                                                
3 Ctr. for Disease Control & Prevention, Number (in Millions) of Civilian 
Noninstitutionalized Persons with Diagnosed Diabetes, 1980-2010, U.S. DEP’T 
HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, 
http://www.cdc.gov/diabetes/statistics/prev/national/figpersons.htm (last 
updated Dec. 9, 2011). 
4 Ctr. for Disease Control & Prevention, National Diabetes Fact Sheet 2011, 
U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES 1 (2011), 
http://www.cdc.gov/diabetes/pubs/pdf/ndfs_2011.pdf. The CDC estimates that 
35% of U.S. adults aged 20 years or older have prediabetes, a condition 
associated with a high risk of developing diabetes.  
5 Therasense, 565 F. Supp. 2d at 1093. 
6 See Adam Heller & Ben Feldman, Electrochemical Glucose Sensors and Their 
Applications in Diabetes Management, 2008 CHEM. REV. 2482, 2492 (2008).  
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All these failures turned into apparent success, however, 
when in 1996 Abbott Laboratories acquired Medisense and 
assigned one of its in-house patent attorneys, Lawrence Pope, to 
take over the prosecution of the disposable test strip patent 
application. Mr. Pope was a veteran patent attorney with years of 
experience representing patent applicants before the patent office.11 
He and a Medisense scientist, Dr. Gordon Sanghera, brainstormed 
various patentability arguments, striking upon a potential point of 
novelty in the disposable test strip application that had been 
previously overlooked: the application described a disposable test 
strip with a glucose sensor for use without any membrane 
protecting the sensor from the many constituents of whole blood, 
while the older, sensor-only technology used a protective 
membrane to separate the blood from the sensor.12 Emphasizing 
the fact that the disposable test strip invention did not require a 
protective membrane might be sufficient to overcome the patent 
office’s rejections and render the claims patentable. 
The difficulty Mr. Pope and Dr. Sanghera faced, however, 
was that a portion of the '382 patent discussed membraneless 
sensors. It read, “Optionally, but preferably when being used on 
live blood, a protective membrane surrounds both the enzyme and 
the mediator layers, permeable to water and glucose molecules.”13 
Because this passage had the potential to defeat the patentability of 
the disposable test strip application, Pope argued that skilled 
artisans in 1983 would have believed that a membrane was 
essential even in the face of the '382 disclosure—in other words, 
that skilled artisans would not have taken the quoted sentence 
literally.14  
The problematic passage was discussed at a meeting 
between Pope and the patent examiner, during which the examiner 
agreed that rejections based on the '382 patent could be overcome 
if an affidavit or other evidentiary showing was made that at the 
time of the invention, a membrane was considered essential.15 This 
evidence was provided in the form of a declaration by Dr. 
Sanghera, in which he explained that: 
 
[B]ased on his historical knowledge he is confident 
that on the filing date of the earliest application 
leading to the present application on June 6, 1983 
                                                
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. at 1093-94. 
13 U.S. Patent No. 4,545,382 (filed Oct. 22, 1982). 
14Therasense, 565 F. Supp. 2d at 1094.  
15 Id. 
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and for a considerable time thereafter one skilled in 
the art would have felt that an active electrode 
comprising an enzyme and a mediator would 
require a protective membrane if it were to be used 
with a whole blood sample. Therefore he is sure that 
one skilled in the art would not read lines 63 to 65 
of column 4 of U.S. Patent No. 4,545,382 to teach 
that the use of a protective membrane with a whole 
blood sample is optionally [sic] or merely 
preferred.16 
 
Along with the declaration, Pope submitted remarks based 
on Sanghera’s representation that argued that a person of ordinary 
skill in the art would have understood the passage in the '382 
patent to be mere “patent phraseology,” as opposed to a technical 
teaching.17 Shortly thereafter, the '551 patent was allowed, and 
Abbott subsequently asserted it against several manufacturers and 
distributors of electrochemical diabetes test strips, including 
Becton Dickinson (“BD”) and Bayer.18  
During the infringement litigation, BD and Bayer 
discovered that before Abbott acquired Medisense, the '636 patent 
(the European counterpart to the '382 patent, with an essentially 
identical written body) was the subject of an inter partes opposition 
proceeding at the European Patent Office that challenged the 
patent’s validity. Important to the opposition to the '636 patent in 
Europe was a document known as the “D1” reference. In the 
proceeding, Medisense argued that D1 could be distinguished on 
two grounds: first, that the '636 invention used a different type of 
chemical (a ferrocene mediator) than was used in D1, and second, 
that D1 required a semi-permeable membrane to control the flow 
of glucose while the '636 invention did not.19 In arguing the latter 
ground, Medisense specifically referenced the “[o]ptionally, but 
preferably” passage shared by the '382 and '636 patents that would 
later become central to Pope and Sanghera’s strategy to secure the 
'551 patent. Medisense’s European appeal brief argued that:  
 
10. The above object is solved by a glucose 
sensor as defined in claim 1 of the patent in suit 
[′382/′636]. Apart from the important feature of 
utilizing a ferrocene or ferrocene derivative as 
mediator, another important difference over D1 
resides in that the claimed glucose sensor—contrary 
                                                
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 1093. 
18 Id. at 1091. 
19 Id. at 1108. 
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to that of D1 which requires a membrane—does not 
have and must not have a semipermeable 
membrane within the meaning of D1. Contrary to 
the semipermeable membrane of D1, the protective 
membrane optionally utilized with the glucose 
sensor of the patent [in] suit is not controlling the 
permeability of the substrate (as set forth above 
under IV.2), in the membrane of D1 the 
permeability for the substrate must be kept on a low 
value to achieve a linear relationship between the 
measures [sic] currency and the substrate 
concentration in the test solution. Rather, in 
accordance with column 5, lines 30 to 33 of the 
patent in suit: “Optionally, but preferably when 
being used on live blood, a protective membrane 
surrounds both the enzyme and the mediator layers, 
permeable to water and glucose molecules.”20 
 
The bolded words are original to Medisense’s brief. A 
similar passage in a subsequent brief added that: 
 
It is submitted that this disclosure is 
unequivocally clear. The protective membrane is 
optional, however, it is preferred when used on live 
blood in order to prevent the larger constituents of 
the blood, in particular erythrocytes from interfering 
with the electrode sensor. Furthermore it is said, 
that said protective membrane should not prevent 
the glucose molecules from penetration, the 
membrane is “permeable” to glucose molecules. 
This teaches the skilled artisan that, whereas the 
semipermeable membrane of D1 must be 
constructed, for example by crosslinking, in such a 
way that the membrane will in fact control the 
permeability of the glucose at the required low 
value, the purpose of the protective membrane in 
the patent in suit is not to control the permeation of 
the glucose molecules. For this very reason the 
sensor electrode as claimed does not have (and must 
not have) a semipermeable membrane in the sense 
of D1.21 
 
                                                
20 Id.  
21 Id. at 1109.  
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 A.    The Case 
  
The three passages quoted above formed the centerpiece of 
the Therasense bench trial on the issue of inequitable conduct. As 
noted in the Introduction, inequitable conduct is a judicially 
created doctrine designed to punish patent applicants who behave 
inappropriately during patent prosecution, which is the ex parte 
process of obtaining a patent.22 There are three aspects to an 
inequitable conduct assertion: first, an act or omission on the part 
of the patent applicant that is material to the decision to allow a 
patent to issue;23 second, the material act or omission must have 
been done with the intent to deceive the patent office;24 and third, 
assuming materiality and intent to deceive have been found, a 
court must weigh the equities to determine whether the patent 
applicant’s conduct warrants the sanction of inequitable conduct: 
patent unenforceability.25 
                                                
22 For significant scholarship on inequitable conduct, see, for example, 
Christopher A. Cotropia, Modernizing Patent Law’s Inequitable Conduct 
Doctrine, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 723, 766 (2009); Thomas Cotter, An 
Economic Analysis of Patent Law’s Inequitable Conduct Doctrine, 53 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 735 (2011); Lisa Dolak, The Inequitable Conduct Gyre Widens, 50 IDEA 
215 (2010); Robert J. Goldman, Evolution of the Inequitable Conduct Defense in 
Patent Litigation, 7 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 37 (1993); John F. Lynch, An Argument 
for Eliminating the Defense of Patent Unenforceability Based on Inequitable 
Conduct, 16 AIPLA Q.J. 7, 8 (1988); Christian E. Mammen, Controlling the 
“Plague”: Reforming the Doctrine of Inequitable Conduct, 24 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 1329, 1332 (2009); David McGowan, Inequitable Conduct, 43 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 945 (2010); Sean M. O’Connor, Defusing the “Atomic Bomb” of Patent 
Litigation: Avoiding and Defending Against the Allegations of Inequitable 
Conduct After McKesson et al., 9 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 330 
(2010); and Lee Petherbridge et al., The Federal Circuit and Inequitable 
Conduct: An Empirical Assessment, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1308-19 (2011). 
See also Christopher A. Cotropia et al., Do Applicant Patent Citations Matter? 
Implications for Presumption of Validity (Stanford Law & Econ. Olin Working 
Paper Grp., Working Paper No. 401, 2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1656568 
(studying the use of applicant-submitted prior art).  
23 Molins PLC v. Textron, 48 F.3d 1172, 1178 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“Inequitable 
conduct includes affirmative misrepresentation of a material fact, failure to 
disclose material information, or submission of false material information, 
coupled with an intent to deceive. . . . One who alleges inequitable conduct 
arising from a failure to disclose prior art must offer clear and convincing proof 
of the materiality of the prior art.”). 
24 Digital Control, Inc. v. Charles Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 
2006) (“[T]he involved conduct, viewed in light of all the evidence, including 
evidence of good faith, must indicate sufficient culpability to require a finding 
of intent to deceive.”) (quoting Paragon Podiatry Lab., Inc. v. KLM Labs., Inc., 
984 F.2d 1182, 1189 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). 
25 Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1365 (Fed. 
Cir. 2008) (“[T]he district court must still balance the equities to determine 
whether the applicant’s conduct before the PTO was egregious enough to 
8
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At the heart of the trial lay the issue of whether 
Medisense’s argument to the European Patent Office that the 
“[o]ptionally, but preferably” sentence in the '636 meant that using 
any membrane at all was unnecessary or whether the argument 
instead related only to the type of membrane in the D1 reference. 
The accused infringers asserted the former: that the passages were 
inconsistent with Pope and Sanghera’s assertions to the U.S. Patent 
Office and thus, because there was no dispute that Pope and 
Sanghera were aware of the '636 proceedings, the failure to 
disclose the fact that Medisense, in defending the '636 patent in 
Europe, had taken a position directly contradictory to the argument 
that it made to secure the allowance of the '551 patent in the U.S. 
amounted to an intent to deceive.26 On the other side, Abbott 
argued that the passages were not inconsistent or contradictory and 
provided lengthy testimony from Pope and Sanghera explaining 
what they understood the relevant statements to mean and why 
they did not disclose the European proceedings to the U.S. Patent 
Office.27  
The outcome of the trial did not favor Abbott.28 The district 
court agreed with the defense, holding that the statements should 
have been disclosed under 37 C.F.R 1.56, arguably one of the 
broadest of several Federal Circuit-sanctioned frameworks for 
analyzing materiality.29 Rule 1.56(b) states that information is 
material to patentability when: 
 
(1) It establishes, either by itself or in combination 
with other information, a prima facie case of 
unpatentability of a claim; or (2) It refutes, or is 
inconsistent with, a position the applicant takes in 
(i) Opposing an argument of unpatentability relied 
on by the Office, or (ii) Asserting an argument of 
patentability.30  
 
                                                                                                         
warrant holding the entire patent unenforceable.”) (citing Monsanto Co. v. 
Bayer BioScience N.V., 363 F.3d 1235, 1239 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). 
26 This was the view adopted by the District Court. See Therasense, 565 F. Supp. 
2d at 1112-16. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2000); see Digital Control, 437 F.3d at 1316 (“In this case, 
the district court, faced with the two versions of Rule 56, determined that the 
new Rule 56 standard was essentially the same as the ‘reasonable examiner’ 
standard” (the pre-1992 version of Rule 1.56)); cf. Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. 
Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (commenting that the 
(pre-1992) Rule 1.56 standard “appears to be the broadest, thus encompassing 
the others”).  
30 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b) (2000). 
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After deciding that the statements were material because 
they were “flatly inconsistent with the main point being made by 
Attorney Pope and Abbott to [the patent office],” the judge found 
that both Pope and Sanghera intended to deceive the patent office 
by failing to disclose the '636 proceedings. The trial court based its 
decision on the reasoning that both “knew or should have known 
that the withheld information would have been highly material to 
the examiner”31 and “had no plausible reason for consciously 
withholding the EPO submissions.”32 The court further found that 
Pope and Sanghera lacked credibility at trial. Given the court’s 
finding of both high materiality and intent to deceive, it entered a 
judgment of inequitable conduct, subsequently awarding the 
accused infringers millions in attorneys’ fees.33 
Abbott appealed to the Federal Circuit, challenging the 
judgment of inequitable conduct.34  The appeal received a forceful 
rejection from two of the three judges assigned to the case. Judge 
Dyk, writing for himself and Judge Friedman, rejected each of 
Abbott’s arguments in turn. Applying, as the district court did, 
Rule 1.56, Judges Dyk and Friedman found the district court’s 
conclusion about the inconsistency not only “not clearly 
erroneous,” but “manifestly correct.”35 According to the court, “To 
deprive an examiner of the EPO statements—statements directly 
contrary to Abbott's representations to the PTO—on the grounds 
that they were not material would be to eviscerate the duty of 
disclosure.”36  
On the subject of intent, the majority likewise affirmed the 
district court, concluding that, given the high materiality of the 
EPO statements coupled with Pope and Sanghera’s knowledge of 
them, the lack of a credible explanation for their withholding was a 
sufficient basis to infer intent to deceive. Moreover, the majority 
held that the trial court’s credibility determination was “virtually 
                                                
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 The district court awarded BD/Nova approximately $6 million in attorneys’ 
fees, and while Bayer and Abbott settled the fee award for an undisclosed 
amount, Bayer’s initial fee petition sought approximately $12 million. See Order 
re Award of Attorney’s Fees, Therasense, Inc. v. Becton Dickinson & Co., No. 
C04-2123 WHA, (N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2009); Declaration of Jason Bartlett in 
Support of Bayer’s Petition for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs, Abbott Diabetes Care 
Inc. v. Roche Diagnostics Corp., No. C05-3117 WHA, (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 
2008); Stipulation Regarding Fees Claimed by Bayer, Abbott Diabetes Care Inc. 
v. Roche Diagnostics Corp., No. C05-3117 WHA, (N.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2008). 
34 The appeal also challenged a related finding of obviousness based on the ’382 
patent. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 593 F.3d 1289, 1293 (Fed. 
Cir. 2010). 
35 Id. at 1303. 
36 Id. at 1304-5. 
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unreviewable.”37 The court, accordingly, affirmed the district 
court’s judgment of inequitable conduct. 
The panel’s decision was not unanimous, however. Judge 
Linn issued a strong dissent in which he rejected both the trial 
judge’s finding of materiality and the trial judge’s findings 
concerning intent to deceive.38 In Judge Linn’s view the statements 
were not inconsistent under precedent requiring that the “most 
reasonable inference” be drawn from a set of facts, nor could Pope 
and Sanghera’s explanations be declared implausible based solely 
on the reasoning that the references themselves were objectively 
material.39 Three months later, the Federal Circuit granted Abbott’s 
petition for rehearing en banc. The scope of the order for rehearing 
was unprecedented in the history of the doctrine, and suggested 
that the court was willing to reconsider almost anything and 
everything about the requirements of inequitable conduct.40 An 
overwhelming number of amici responded, submitting at least 39 
briefs advocating a range of options, including the elimination of 
the doctrine altogether. Most suggested some form of modification 
or clarification of the materiality or intent elements of the existing 
analysis.41 
 
B.  The En Banc Opinion 
 
On May 25, 2011, the court issued an opinion that sought 
to radically reshape the landscape of inequitable conduct.42 The 
result was as close as any opinion the court had previously issued. 
On materiality, six judges—including Judge Jimmie V. Reyna, 
who had joined the court just a month and a half earlier—voted to 
require “but for” materiality, a standard that the court intends to be 
much stricter than the patent regulation-driven standard that had 
traditionally governed.43  
Under a “but for” standard, materiality is only established if 
                                                
37 Id. at 1306 (quoting Hambsch v. Dep’t of the Treasury, 796 F.2d 430, 436 
(Fed. Cir. 
1986)).  
38 Id. at 1312-24 (Linn, J., dissenting).  
39 Id. 
40 Therasense, Inc. v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 374 Fed. Appx. 35 (Fed. Cir. 
Apr. 26, 2010) (nonprecedential). The Order posed six questions, including such 
fundamental topics as “Should the materiality-intent-balancing framework for 
inequitable conduct be modified or replaced?” and “If so, how?” Id. 
41 See Joy Bala, Note, Amicus Briefs: Sounding off on Reforming Inequitable 
Conduct, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 125 (2011) (collecting, reporting, and analyzing 
the positions of the amici in the Therasense case).  
42 Therasense, Inc. v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(en banc). 
43 Id. at 1291. 
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the patent would not have issued but for the alleged material act. 
For example, if an applicant fails to disclose prior art during the 
prosecution, “that prior art is but-for material if the PTO would not 
have allowed a claim had it been aware of the undisclosed prior 
art.”44 Of course, the majority commented, “but for” materiality 
implicates the relevant legal rules for the patent application 
process, not those of an infringement action. Thus, when making 
the assessment, courts must apply a preponderance of the evidence 
standard (as opposed to a clear and convincing standard) and give 
claims their broadest possible construction (as opposed to applying 
the Federal Circuit law that governs the determination of patent 
claim scope).45  
The court’s new materiality standard is subject to a crucial 
exception, however: “When the patentee has engaged in 
affirmative acts of egregious misconduct, such as the filing of an 
unmistakably false affidavit, the misconduct is material.”46 Adding 
another layer, the exception is subject to its own exception: 
“[N]either mere nondisclosure of prior art references to the PTO 
nor failure to mention prior art references in an affidavit constitutes 
affirmative egregious misconduct.”47 
Just as the majority specified a stricter standard for 
materiality, so too did it raise the bar for establishing intent. Before 
Therasense, there was some uncertainty about the level of intent 
needed to establish culpability for violations of the duty of candor. 
In the opinion, the court specified that going forward, inequitable 
conduct will require a “specific intent”48 to deceive the patent 
office: “[T]he accused infringer must prove by clear and 
convincing evidence that the applicant knew of the reference, knew 
that it was material, and made a deliberate decision to withhold 
it.”49 As before, intent must be established separate from 
materiality, viz. a district court may not infer intent solely from 
materiality.  
 
II.      LAW AND POLICY ISSUES RAISED BY 
THERASENSE 
 
The Federal Circuit’s opinion in Therasense v. Becton 
Dickinson raises serious concerns for innovation law and policy. 
                                                
44 Id.  
45 Id. at 1291-92. 
46 Id. at 1292. 
47 Id. at 1292-93. 
48 Id. at 1290 (“To prevail on a claim of inequitable conduct, the accused 
infringer must prove that the patentee acted with the specific intent to deceive 
the PTO.”). 
49 Id.  
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This Part of the Article identifies some of the concerns raised by 
the opinion and provides an early analysis of their significance. 
The analysis is loosely framed by the majority’s instrumental claim 
that the holding of Therasense will favorably address “adjudication 
cost and complexity, reduced likelihood of settlement, burdened 
courts, strained PTO resources, increased PTO backlog, and 
impaired patent quality”50—a a veritable slam-dunk in terms of 
public benefit. As we demonstrate below, there are reasons to be 
concerned that Chief Judge Rader’s opinion might be too sanguine 
in its predictions. 
The analysis is organized as follows: Part A describes how 
the policy of Therasense is to shift rents from the public to the 
patent-seeking class, and discusses how the court’s implementation 
of this policy can result in serious efficiency problems. Part B 
addresses the implications of the court’s decision for patent 
quality. Part C considers the impact of the decision on patent 
litigation, including the prospect of a reinvigorated antitrust 
doctrine in patent law. Part D evaluates whether practitioners 
should perceive greater legal protection from inequitable conduct 
findings because of the decision and whether practitioners will no 
longer make large disclosures of prior art in the course of patent 
prosecution. Part E represents an attempt to synthesize the 
concerns and analysis laid out in more detail in Parts A through D.  
 
A.  A Patent Handout 
From nearly any perspective, the Federal Circuit’s holding 
in Therasense represents a naked attempt to shift economic rents 
from the public and the patent office to the patent bar and those 
who seek patents. Prior to Therasense, patent applicants were 
required to take due care when prosecuting patent applications. 
This in part meant that an applicant was required to disclose to the 
patent office information that the applicant knew about and which 
the applicant knew a reasonable examiner would have considered 
important in deciding whether to issue a patent. After Therasense, 
patent applicants no longer have this duty—at least to the extent 
courts will enforce it—unless the information at issue falls into a 
very narrow category. Specifically: information known to the 
patent applicant and unknown to the patent office that the applicant 
knows would cause the patent office to not allow the claims in an 
application to issue as a patent if disclosed.51 In addition, after 
                                                
50 Id.  
51 The court recognized an exception “in cases of affirmative egregious 
misconduct.” This exception, according to the majority, emerges from a set of 
Supreme Court cases dealing with fraud and unclean hands in the context of 
patent acquisition and seems targeted generally at planned “‘scheme[s]’ to 
defraud the PTO and the Courts.” Id. (quoting Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. 
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Therasense, a patent applicant must by his actions or omissions 
specifically intend to mislead the patent office into issuing claims 
it would not have otherwise issued, whereas before, a patent 
applicant could have had sufficient mental culpability if he knew 
or objectively should have known that his actions were misleading.  
Because the court’s holding pushes in the direction of 
reducing the care and patent quality responsibilities that applicants 
have in their dealings with the patent office, it is logical to predict 
that the court has made patent examination marginally less 
expensive for patent applicants. But making patenting cheaper by 
requiring less of patent applicants in the course of patent creation 
presents concerns, because it occurs in a context in which it is 
commonly accepted that (1) the patent office already does not have 
the resources to ensure that only deserving inventions receive 
patents, and (2) some of the costs of patent creation—in particular 
costs of information about what the invention is, how it relates to 
prior innovations, and often whether it actually meets the statutory 
requirements for patentability—are more efficiently borne by 
patent applicants. Thus, while the Therasense-encouraged shift in 
rents may be a good outcome for patent lawyers and for those who 
seek cheap patents, it may be less of a good outcome for the patent 
office, competitors, and the public.  
Our reasoning is based on the stated purpose of the 
majority opinion. On its own terms, the holding of Therasense 
seeks to reduce the private resources devoted to patent 
examination. But unless one adopts the position that those private 
resources were in the past mostly wasted, in which case spending 
less on patent creation might be fine, someone must pay the cost if 
the same level of investment in patent creation is to be maintained. 
With patent applicants no longer paying as much of the cost of the 
patent creation process as they were before, the institution most 
likely called upon to compensate will be the patent office. 
Unfortunately, it is already conventional wisdom that the patent 
office cannot meet the investment that the pre-Therasense law 
required of it.52 In fact, the patent office argued directly against the 
new rules for inequitable conduct that the Federal Circuit imposed 
in Therasense.53 It is therefore difficult to expect that the patent 
office will increase its investment in the patent creation process to 
make up the difference.  
In its quest to make patenting cheaper for patent applicants, 
                                                                                                         
Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 245 (1944)).  
52 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1495, 1499-1500 (2001); Gideon Parchomovsky & Michael Mattioli, 
Partial Patents, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 207, 215 (2011) (describing the increasing 
backlog at the patent office).  
53 See Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1305-06 (Bryson, J., dissenting). 
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the Therasense majority also ignores almost entirely the concern 
that patent applicants are often the most efficient (i.e., lowest cost) 
providers of certain information important to the patent creation 
process. For example, some information will be readily available 
to the patent applicant due simply to the fact that the applicant may 
be a regular patent applicant in a particular industry. Other 
information may be at the applicant’s fingertips because it is 
information the applicant discovered and utilized in determining 
how to address the innovation problem it confronted and that led to 
the patent application at issue. Still other information may be 
literally sitting on the applicant’s desk because the applicant 
discovered it when preparing the patent application. In many 
instances, it will be cheaper for the applicant to provide this sort of 
information to the patent creation process than it will be for the 
patent office to discover the information on its own and appreciate 
its significance.54 And in some circumstances, this information 
may be uniquely (or nearly so) within the knowledge and control 
of the applicant. 
When information pertaining to patentability is uniquely 
within the control of the patent applicant, the comparative 
efficiency gains in having the applicant provide the information 
can skyrocket. The information described above mostly concerns 
the innovation context of the invention. But there is other 
information outside the innovation context of the invention that is 
nonetheless crucial to the issue of patentability. Much of this other 
type of information, such as the timing of the invention, public 
uses and sales, and abandonments and the like, may be uniquely 
(or nearly so) within the control of the patent applicant. In many 
instances, it may be fairly inexpensive for the applicant to make 
the disclosure, although it may adversely affect the patentability of 
the claims the applicant seeks and thus increase the costs and fees 
that will be paid to a patent agent or attorney to negotiate the 
issuance of a patent. By contrast, it is much more expensive–in 
practical terms approaching infinity–for the patent office to bring 
information uniquely within the control of the applicant to bear on 
the patent creation process.  
The majority’s purpose in Therasense is to make patent 
creation cheaper for the patent bar and for those who seek patents. 
The savings comes in the form of requiring from patent applicants 
less care in the patent creation process and a lower contribution to 
patent quality. Therasense is therefore a patent handout. Reflected 
back against the court’s claims for the Therasense holding, the 
                                                
54 We recognize that applicants do not have a duty to search the prior art. The 
information we are discussing in this section is information that the applicant, 
viz. inventors, attorneys or agents, and everyone else substantively involved 
with the application, already has in its possession. 
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above discussion raises concerns about whether Therasense really 
will favorably address “strained PTO resources.”55 Indeed, if the 
patent office attempts to add resources to the patent creation 
process to compensate for those that private parties are now able to 
retain, it is possible that exactly the opposite will happen: patent 
office resources may become more strained than they were 
before.56 And if the patent office does not find some way to pick 
up the tab for the private savings, then it is likely that the public 
will, in the form of inefficiently higher prices for goods and 
services. The reason for this is that more low quality patents might 
be expected as a consequence of the Therasense decision. It is to 
that issue that we turn next.  
 
B.  Implications for Patent Quality 
 
There has been much hue and cry in the last decade about 
the quality of patents, viz. a conventional wisdom has developed 
that many patents issue from the patent office that should not have 
issued because the inventions disclosed and claimed in the patents 
do not satisfy the statutory requirements for patentability.57 The 
                                                
55 Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1290. 
56 It must be noted that the Therasense opinion did not render the patent office 
legally helpless when it comes to enforcing the duty of candor imposed by the 
patent regulations. The office might still enforce Rule 56 on its own. It might 
also raise patent application fees and maintenance fees; the net effect of such a 
strategy could be to take back some of the profits that the Federal Circuit handed 
to patent applicants in Therasense, although such a strategy should be expected 
to be less efficient for reasons discussed above, as well as for the reason that the 
costs will not be nearly as specifically targeted to the parties that impose them. 
Another alternative still is for the patent office to demand, through Rule 105 
requests, the same kind of information Rule 56(b) requires of applicants. Failure 
to respond truthfully to such requests can result in abandonment. See Star Fruits 
S.N.C. v. United States, 393 F.3d 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see also Lee 
Petherbridge, Positive Examination, 46 IDEA 173 (2006) (arguing for the use of 
rule 105 by the patent office to gather information from patent applicants about 
the invention for which a patent is sought). Another possibility is the increased 
use by the government of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2006), which makes it a crime to 
“knowingly and willfully” make a “materially false . . . statement” or “conceal . 
. . a material fact” “in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, 
legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United States”; compare 
United States v. Markham, 537 F.2d 187 (5th Cir. 1976), which affirmed a 
conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2006) based on the act of attempting to 
conceal from the patent office the true inventor of the process for which a patent 
was sought.   
57 See, e.g., R. Polk Wagner, Understanding Patent-Quality Mechanisms, 157 U. 
PA. L. REV. 2135, 2138 (2009) (defining a low-quality patent). One of the many 
excellent comments we received from practitioners in connection with an earlier 
draft of this Article raises the concern that even assuming that patent applicants 
use the Therasense decision to avoid disclosing information that could either 
lead to a rejection or be invalidating in its own right, would not patent quality 
16
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opinion for the court boldly asserts that Therasense will favorably 
address “impaired patent quality.”58 While the future is not yet 
written, we develop an analysis below that suggests that such a 
claim might turn out to be incorrect. We suggest instead that after 
Therasense, for those not cynical enough to believe that patent 
quality is already hopelessly low, it is reasonable to expect the 
quality of patents to suffer even more than it already does. The 
main reason is that the patent office, which is already thought to be 
fairly poorly informed when it determines patentability, will be 
even less well-informed about the invention, the relevant art, and 
other facts that relate to the technicalities of applying the statutory 
standards for patentability. In other words, the patent office will be 
even more in the dark when conducting patent examination after 
Therasense than it was before. In the words of the patent office 
(referring to earlier efforts on the part of the patent bar to impose a 
standard like the one the Federal Circuit imposed in Therasense):  
 
The suggested “but for” standard would not cause 
the Office to obtain the information it needs to 
evaluate patentability so that its decisions may be 
presumed correct by the courts. If the Office does 
not have needed information, meaningful 
examination of patent applications will take place 
for the first time in an infringement case before a 
district court. Courts will become increasingly less 
confident of the Office's product if they get the 
impression that practitioners and inventors can 
routinely withhold information from the Office, or 
that practitioners and inventors can make up their 
own minds about what is patentable.59 
 
It is common ground to most who study the patent system 
                                                                                                         
nonetheless be protected by the threat of a determination of invalidity in view of 
the art that was not disclosed? We think the answer is, yes, partially; but only 
partially. We do not dispute that low quality patents can be eliminated by 
litigation. But invalidating a patent in litigation can be expensive, even if it 
occurs at the summary judgment stage. In addition, litigating a patent that should 
not have issued is, at some level, a waste of money. It is a waste for the patent 
office to examine; it is a waste for a competitor to have to defend against; and it 
is a waste of judicial resources. Furthermore, an invalid patent might still serve a 
sterile anti-competitive purpose because it allows a patent holder to inflict costs 
on a competitor. Finally, in the United States, the showing required to invalidate 
a patent is, formally at least, somewhat high. Patents are presumptively valid 
and must be proved invalid by the clear and convincing evidence. See Microsoft 
Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011).  
58 Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1290. 
59 Duty of Disclosure, 57 FED. REG. 2020, 2024 (Jan. 17, 1992) (to be codified at 
37 C.F.R. pts. 1, 10). 
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that when patents are issued for inventions that do not satisfy the 
requirements of patentability there are competitive costs to be 
paid.60 The reason is that the patent system is itself not costless. By 
creating private property for limited times in inventions, the patent 
system both confers benefits and imposes costs. The benefits are 
often touted; the main one being the optimization of the production 
of new and useful information, a generally non-rivalrous and non-
excludable good that theory suggests will be underproduced 
without some kind of positive interference in the market. The costs 
of a patent system, on the other hand, include the supramarginal 
cost pricing that may be imposed when patents are used—as they 
were intended—to reduce competition in a market.  
Because of the competitive impact of patents, patent policy 
has long been chary of patents that do not meet the requirements of 
patentability. Stated generally, the reasons are straightforward. 
Low-quality patents—those that should not have issued because 
they do not meet the statutory requirements for patentability—may 
give patentees some pricing power in instances where the patentee 
has not given the public sufficiently valuable new and useful 
information. It is, in a sense, money for nothing (or at least money 
for not a good enough something). The result is that competitors 
and the consuming public pay more for goods and services than 
they need to, patentees profit more from the patent system than 
policy requires, and the efficiency benefits of competition are not 
optimized. Indeed, the Therasense case arguably embodies this 
very concern: the Federal Circuit concluded that the '551 patent 
apparently should not have issued in view of the '382 patent 
(according to the court, it was not an invention over existing 
information—in patent parlance, it was obvious when the 
application was filed). Assuming the court’s analysis is correct, 
diabetics using products that were embodiments of the invention 
claimed in the '551 patent might have been paying too much for 
their treatment, not to mention the fact that research into new 
innovations for diabetics might also have been marginally 
suppressed.61 
As discussed at length in the previous part, the direction of 
the Therasense holding is to require from patent applicants less 
care in and less contribution of information to the patent creation 
process. Given the sort of information that may go missing, 
discussed ante in Part II.A, it is reasonable to suspect that the 
marginal quality of information brought to bear on the patentability 
                                                
60 See, e.g., Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, Why “Bad” Patents Survive in the 
Market and How Should We Change?—The Private and Social Costs of Patents, 
55 EMORY L. J. 61, 77 (2006). 
61 We use this merely as a hypothetical example of patent theory, and do not 
mean to suggest that this is what actually occurred for this specific patent.   
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determination by the patent office will be poorer. However, little 
else about the patent granting process has changed. When an 
applicant files an application and pays a fee, it is presumably 
entitled to a patent unless the patent office can successfully 
demonstrate why it is not.62 This reinforces the interpretation that 
patent quality may be discouraged, rather than encouraged, by the 
Federal Circuit’s decision in Therasense, because the patent office 
will not have the information it needs to lawfully reject patent 
claims.63  
Not only might patent quality suffer because of Therasense, 
but, less able to distinguish deserving applications from 
undeserving ones, examiners might also more often reject claims 
that should be allowed. The effect of this eventuality, should it 
come to pass, would be to reduce the public’s access to new 
innovations. Spurious rejections of claims to meritorious 
inventions also damage the incentive structure of the patent system 
by discouraging some set of potential innovators from innovating 
or disclosing their innovations. 
Obviously, whether Therasense will have a positive impact 
on patent quality, as the court’s opinion predicts, remains to be 
seen. Our analysis suggests that it is at least possible that that 
prediction may prove incorrect. Indeed, Therasense could 
encourage exactly the opposite outcome: low-quality patents might 
become even more prevalent than they were before, and inventors 
of genuine innovations—the sort policy desires to encourage with 
the patent system--might even be marginally discouraged.  
If more low-quality patents issue because of Therasense, 
then one might anticipate—as the patent office did years ago64--
that there will be consequences to patent litigation. In the next Part, 
we consider the majority’s claim about the salutary benefits of 
Therasense on patent litigation.  
 
                                                
62 See Lemley, supra note 53, at 1500. 
63 Thus, while we are cognizant that there may be a point of diminishing returns 
in terms of the level of examination provided by the patent office, see id. at 
1498-1500 (pointing out that we cannot afford perfection in patent office 
determinations), we think that this threshold has not yet been reached, at least 
with respect to the information that is the subject of inequitable conduct. First, 
there is evidence that the rate at which patents are commercialized is substantial. 
See Jason Rantanen et al., America Invents, More or Less?, 160 U PA. L. REV. 
PENNUMBRA 229, 242 (2012) (reporting aggregate data of five to fifty percent 
of patents being commercialized). Second, the type of information that is the 
subject matter of inequitable conduct is precisely the type of information that is 
most beneficial to the patentability determination when disclosed by the 
applicant. See Jason Rantanen & Lee Petherbridge, Toward a System of 
Invention Registration: The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 110 MICH. L. 
REV.: FIRST IMPRESSIONS 24, 27-28 (2011). 
64 See supra note 60.  
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C.  Implications for Patent Litigation 
 
The opinion for the court makes a number of claims about 
the salutary impact of the Therasense holding on patent litigation. 
In particular, the court declares that the holding will favorably 
address the “increased adjudication cost and complexity, reduced 
likelihood of settlement, [and] burdened courts”65 that arose from 
the pre-Therasense inequitable conduct jurisprudence. In this Part, 
we use theoretical logic and common sense to develop an analysis 
that challenges the claim that Therasense will have an efficiency-
enhancing impact on patent litigation. We emphasize four specific 
points. First, if Therasense encourages more low quality patents, 
that fact may adversely impact the amount and intensity of patent 
litigation. Second, Therasense did not get rid of patent acquisition 
misconduct doctrine—instead, it might even have made it more 
complex and dangerous to patent practitioners and the patent 
system’s reputation. Third, Therasense adjusts the risk incentives 
of the patent bar, and the expectations for agent risk-taking of 
those who seek patents. Fourth, building on the third point, we 
explain that if the majority’s holding ends up permitting conduct 
that competitors find inappropriate, something akin to moral 
outrage at patent applicant behavior may encourage competitors to 
more intensely pursue litigation than they might otherwise. This 
effect may be enhanced by the effective convergence of the 
requirements for inequitable conduct and Walker Process fraud. 
The previous Part discusses many of the concerns raised by 
the prospect that Therasense may encourage low-quality patents, 
so here we will be brief. We postulate two things: (1) more low-
quality patents issued by the patent office means that more patent 
enforcement actions will involve low-quality patents, and (2) when 
faced with a claim of infringement based on a low-quality patent, a 
competitor will resist liability more vigorously than when faced 
with a high-quality patent. Our point here resolves to a simple 
logical syllogism: if Therasense increases the amount of low 
quality patents, then competitors will (at least on the margins) 
spend more to resist the enforcement of patents.66 If that turns out 
                                                
65 Therasense v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
66 Note that we accept that patent litigation is mostly an economic exercise, viz. 
that when it makes sense to spend money defending the suit, defendants will do 
so; when it does not make economic sense, they probably will not. On this point, 
we offer two thoughts: first, we speculate that because of Therasense, there will 
develop marginally more cases where it makes sense for defendants to spend 
more resources resisting the enforcement of a patent; second, because of 
Therasense, defendants will face enforcement actions involving patents that 
would not have been available for enforcement in a pre-Therasense legal 
context.  
20
Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 14 [2012], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol14/iss1/3
14 Yale J.L. & Tech. 226 (2012)        2011-2012 
 
 246 
to be the case, and if patent enforcers are unwilling to back down, 
then Therasense may well increase adjudication cost instead of 
reducing it as the court’s opinion predicts.  
Another reason that Therasense may not favorably address 
“increased adjudication cost and complexity, reduced likelihood of 
settlement, [and] burdened courts”67 is that Therasense did not get 
rid of patent acquisition misconduct doctrine. Although it appears 
entirely unappreciated by the initial response to the case by the 
patent bar, Therasense arguably made patent acquisition more 
complex and dangerous to patent practitioners. Before Therasense, 
only one patent acquisition misconduct doctrine was substantially 
used in patent litigation. After Therasense, there are potentially 
three separate legal theories that must be analyzed when a claim 
based on misconduct during patent prosecution is made.  
The first theory is the doctrine of unclean hands, a defense 
that was probably so unused that its reawakening by the Federal 
Circuit is likely the equivalent of raising it from the dead. Perhaps 
it was unavoidable, but as the court sought to place limits on the 
doctrine of inequitable conduct, it discussed and then set aside this 
old Supreme Court doctrine as untouchable. In so doing, the 
majority may have inadvertently reinvigorated it by the explicit 
recognition of its viability. Thus, even before getting to the 
question of inequitable conduct, one might expect accused 
infringers to assert unclean hands, which, as the majority noted, 
“remains available to supply a remedy for egregious misconduct 
like that in the Supreme Court cases.”68 
In addition to reviving an unclean hands defense, the 
majority’s framework for inequitable conduct itself necessitates 
two distinct assessments of materiality: the “but for” invalidity 
analysis and the “affirmative egregious misconduct” (solely before 
the patent office) analysis. Peeling back yet another layer, the “but 
for” determination requires the court to assess validity against the 
patent office’s standards for allowing patents—standards the 
district courts are unfamiliar with applying in patent cases—rather 
than the standards that typically apply when conducting 
infringement proceedings in district courts. Thus, for example, 
claim scope in patent litigation has for decades been determined 
according to rules laid down by the Federal Circuit. A district 
court, when determining patent infringement, patent invalidity, and 
a host of other patent-related questions must still apply those rules. 
Moreover, when district courts apply the substantive law of 
infringement and invalidity, they will be applying it to facts 
developed in anticipation of that law in the context of the clear and 
                                                
67 Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1290. 
68 Id. at 1287. 
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convincing evidence standard.  
However, when a district court turns its attention to 
inequitable conduct, it must now change gears and apply different 
legal rules in the context of a different standard of proof. Rather 
than apply, for example, the familiar law of patent claim 
construction, district courts will be asked to determine patent claim 
scope for inequitable conduct purposes by applying the standard 
that the patent office uses, viz. courts should give patent claims 
their “broadest reasonable construction” (instead of the 
construction they have received for the rest of the litigation). Next, 
courts will need to determine not whether the patent claims 
properly construed are invalid, but instead whether the patent 
office would have allowed the claims to issue as a patent. 
Moreover, courts will be applying that novel standard in the 
context of a burden of proof different from that with which they 
and patent litigants are ordinarily familiar, namely, in the post-
Therasense world courts and litigants must operate in the context 
of a preponderance of the evidence standard (as opposed to the 
traditional clear and convincing evidence standard).69 This 
framework raises obvious issues about the complexity and 
substantive accuracy of patent acquisition misconduct litigation 
going forward.  
This new, multi-layered inequitable conduct framework 
may also add to litigation costs and burdens in other ways. For 
example, the new structure might strongly encourage additional 
trials on inequitable conduct. Prior to Therasense, separate trials on 
inequitable conduct (as opposed to questions of validity and 
infringement) were sometimes held due to the concern that 
inequitable conduct claims could poison juries addressing the 
broader issues involved in the infringement proceeding.70 Under 
the Therasense framework, however, the analysis courts must 
undertake to determine inequitable conduct seems to have become 
more, rather than less, complex and involved so that not only do 
the traditional issues of prejudice still exist, but there will be 
additional issues about which prejudice will be a concern and 
about which jurors and jurists can get confused. Thus, the need to 
analyze inequitable conduct claims under a wholly separate set of 
legal standards than those that apply to the rest of patent litigation 
raises the specter of an increase rather than decrease in the 
requirement of double trials.  
Another unintended consequence of the need to apply two 
different patent scopes in a single patent litigation may be that 
doing so will give the accused infringer a second bite at the apple. 
                                                
69 Id. at 1291-92.  
70 See, e.g., Gardco Mfg., Inc. v. Herst Lighting Co., 820 F.2d 1209 (Fed. Cir. 
1987). 
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Accused infringers will first be able to advocate a claim 
construction that favors their invalidity positions and then, if the 
court rules against them, will be able to assert inequitable conduct 
claims based on their broad, putatively “reasonable” construction.  
Given these concerns, it is at least possible, if not likely, 
that the new framework articulated by the majority will not reduce 
the cost or complexity of individual determinations of inequitable 
conduct allegations.71  
A third concern presented by Therasense that impacts 
patent litigation is the concern that the opinion adjusts the risk 
incentives of the patent bar, and the expectations for agent risk-
taking of those who seek patents. Attorneys naturally push the 
boundaries of the law—it is their job, after all. Even patent 
attorneys, who have long cultivated the image of neutral 
participants in the patent application process, are nevertheless 
ethically obligated to advocate on behalf of their clients.72 Yet with 
Therasense, the veneer of being a neutral participant in an ex parte 
proceeding has largely been stripped away, and it is reasonable to 
expect that no matter how noble the person, attorneys involved in 
patent acquisition will act more like their counterparts in other 
fields, aggressively jockeying for the most advantageous outcome 
for their clients.73  
It is therefore reasonable to suspect that Therasense may 
encourage patent applicants and attorneys to engage in riskier 
                                                
71 We also question the impact that inequitable conduct really has on discovery 
costs, an assertion for which there is at present a lack of empirical evidence. Nor 
do we see much of a change in this area as a result of Therasense, in part, we 
speculate, because limits on the scope of discovery are often a function of the 
tolerances of the parties and the relevant judge as opposed to the specific legal 
theories advanced. Moreover, even without the doctrine of inequitable conduct, 
many other patent law doctrines permit and invite an inquiry into the patent 
holder’s documents that goes well beyond the documentation necessary to 
support conception and reduction to practice. To take just the example given by 
the majority, that “[a] charge of inequitable conduct conveniently expands 
discovery into corporate practices before patent filing,” that same discovery can 
be justified under a number of doctrines, from challenging best mode to 
exploring patent ownership issues to contesting objective evidence of 
nonobviousness. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1288. Indeed, a more important tool 
for limiting the discovery costs of inequitable conduct probably existed before 
Therasense. Inequitable conduct is required to be pled with particularity. Until it 
is, a patent holder’s counsel may be able to successfully oppose some 
inequitable conduct-related discovery on the ground that it is irrelevant. In short, 
while inequitable conduct may be an arrow in the litigation discovery counsel’s 
quiver, it is by no means the only one, or even the most potent in most cases.  
72 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble (1983). 
73 We do not mean to suggest that all patent attorneys and agents engage in risky 
behavior. But when one looks at the incentives that Therasense creates, they 
unquestionably lean in favor of permitting riskier behavior when it comes to 
obtaining a patent.  
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behavior—to move closer to the new line that the court has drawn 
as the boundary of acceptable behavior. Today’s egregious conduct 
may become tomorrow’s run-of-the-mill inequitable conduct 
allegation, while yesterday’s inequitable conduct will become 
tomorrow’s mandatory practice. For reasons already discussed, and 
for some that follow, there is little reason to think that this shift in 
risk incentives will result in fewer charges of inequitable conduct. 
Instead, a more likely consequence might be that future charges 
will reflect claims of much uglier and more serious misconduct 
than courts regularly see today.  
A final point to raise also involves adjusted risk incentives. 
Inequitable conduct (or patent misconduct litigation) may, over 
time, be stimulated by Therasense, because the conduct 
Therasense might protect as “acceptable” might normatively be 
seen as unacceptable by some patent lawyers and by defendants in 
patent litigation suits. If so, defendants might vigorously pursue 
inequitable conduct claims even in the face of unfavorable rules.  
At bottom, this point is about rules not aligning well with 
norms. It is quite conceivable that some inequitable conduct 
charges are not really about technical violations of rules laid down 
by the Federal Circuit. Rather, they may be driven by a litigant’s or 
a judge’s moral view of right and wrong—a a moral compass, if 
you will. Unlike the rules of inequitable conduct, this normative 
standard may be harder to move with a Federal Circuit opinion, 
especially among district court judges, whose moral compasses 
may have a fixed bearing as a result of their exposure to a range of 
misconduct charges from outside the boundaries of patent law.  
So while patent attorneys, and perhaps even the Federal 
Circuit, may see that the rules of Therasense permit certain forms 
of conduct that previously were prohibited, that conduct may still 
be perceived as “wrongful” by district court judges and other front 
line decision makers. And if, as we speculate above, future 
inequitable conduct claims involve behavior that is more readily 
perceived as morally wrongful, front line decision makers may be 
inclined to let those claims proceed all the way through to trial, 
rather than summarily dismissing them.  
The gravity of this point is augmented when one realizes 
that after Therasense, the requirements of inequitable conduct have 
largely converged with the requirements for an antitrust claim 
based on Walker Process fraud.74 Prior to Therasense, the bench 
                                                
74 Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Patent Exclusions and Antitrust After Therasense 34 
(U. Iowa Legal Stud. Res. Paper, No. 11-39, 2011), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1917074. Under the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Walker Process Equipment Inc. v. Food Machinery and Chemical Corp., 382 
U.S. 172 (1965), a patent holder may be liable under antitrust laws for filing a 
patent infringement suit in order to exclude a rival if the patent was obtained 
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and bar recognized that the degree of conduct necessary to render a 
patent unenforceable for inequitable conduct was less than that 
needed to support an antitrust claim.75 After Therasense, there is 
considerable doubt that this statement is still correct.76 If true, it 
means that post-Therasense, inequitable conduct claims are more 
likely to provide a sound basis for antitrust claims than before.77  
The end result might be greater costs and greater 
complexities in patent litigation.  
 
D.  Implications for Patent Practitioners  
 
By its own terms, the Federal Circuit’s Therasense opinion 
seeks to help patent practitioners. In this Part, we consider whether 
the patent bar and those who seek patents secured at least 
something substantial from the court’s opinion. Put differently, did 
the Therasense opinion substantially address the claims and 
concerns that patent practitioners generally made and pressed in 
connection with the en banc case? Or might there be reason to 
think that the majority’s opinion will fail to bring the promised 
relief? If the latter, the concerns developed in the prior Parts of this 
Article about the impact of the court’s opinion on the patent 
system as a whole might not find much equilibration through the 
cost savings the court sought to give to patent applicants.   
This Part proceeds by first considering whether the 
Therasense opinion should be expected to have the impact the 
court anticipates on case outcomes, and then moves to an analysis 
of whether it should be expected to have the impact the court 
anticipates on patent prosecution behavior. Our analysis suggests a 
disturbing probability. There is reason to believe that the 
Therasense opinion may have little specific impact on case 
outcomes, namely that it is not the prophylactic against findings of 
                                                                                                         
through fraud on the patent office. Hovenkamp, supra at 1.  
75 Id. at 33. 
76 As Professor Hovenkamp commented post-Therasense, “[the] statement that 
the degree of inequitable conduct necessary to invalidate a patent is not as great 
as the degree needed to support an antitrust claim was very likely overruled by 
Therasense’s requirement that even inequitable conduct involves actual 
knowledge and intent to deceive. Once the inequitable conduct doctrine is recast 
this way there seems to be no room for a finding of ‘greater’ inequitable conduct 
in antitrust cases.” Id. at 34. 
77 Not to overstate this point, Hovenkamp does identify a principal distinction 
between Walker Process antitrust claims and inequitable conduct claims: the 
former is based on actions and state of mind at the time a patent infringement 
action is filed, while the latter is based on actions and state of mind that occur 
during the patent prosecution process. This may lead to some circumstances in 
which a patent holder may be subject to a finding of inequitable conduct, but not 
an antitrust claim, and others in which the opposite may be true. Id. at 29.  
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misconduct it has been trumpeted to be. In addition, we speculate 
that the holding might have little impact on the single most 
important concern raised by the patent bar and those who seek 
patents—a a perception that because of inequitable conduct 
doctrine patent applicants sometimes make costly disclosures of 
prior art that are entirely unimportant to a reasonable examiner in 
deciding patentability. Instead, the most significant impact of 
Therasense may only be that patent applicants have been given 
more leeway to determine unilaterally the statutory requirements 
for patentability in connection with prior art that is difficult or 
impossible for the patent office and competitors to learn about. 
Therasense may thus end up accentuating the negative aspects of 
the current scheme while providing little to no positive systemic 
benefits.  
 
1. Will Therasense Really Change Case Outcomes? 
 
We think it clear that the Federal Circuit thought it was 
making a sea change with its decision in Therasense. The early 
reaction from the bar and some commentators has been 
jubilation.78 A common sense has quickly developed that the 
decision will have the impact of helping to protect patents from 
claims that they were obtained inequitably, and by extension, 
helping to protect the reputations of the patent lawyers whose 
responsibility it is to procure patents from the patent office.  
Perhaps the ultimate question for courts and lawyers, then, 
is whether the Federal Circuit’s opinion will affect case outcomes: 
will Therasense work to change the outcomes in any particular 
case, and perhaps, will Therasense produce a systemic result of 
fewer findings of inequitable conduct than before? Certainly there 
is some reason for the patent bar’s jubilant belief that case 
outcomes will be impacted. As we have already noted, the majority 
opinion clearly indicates the intent to make it more difficult to 
establish inequitable conduct. This signaling effect alone may be 
sufficient to cause trial judges to find inequitable conduct less 
                                                
78 See, e.g., Lawrence T. Kass & Nathaniel T. Browand, ‘Therasense’: Vaccine 
for a Plague, NAT’L L.J., June 6, 2011, 
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202496036951&Therasense
_Vaccine_for_a_plague&slreturn=1&hbxlogin=1; Nate Raymond, Federal 
Circuit Guts Inequitable Conduct Defense, Patent Plaintiffs Rejoice, AM. 
LAWYER, May 25, 2011, 
http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1202495333432&Federal_Cir
cuit_Guts_Inequitable_Conduct_Defense_Patent_Plaintiffs_Rejoice. Law firms 
have issued similar commentary. See, e.g., Jeff Mills & Brian Banner, Client 
Alert: Federal Circuit Makes it More Difficult to Prove Inequitable Conduct 
During Patent Prosecution, KING & SPALDING LAW (May 31, 2011), 
http://www.kslaw.com/imageserver/KSPublic/library /publication/ca053111.pdf.  
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The formal framework constructed by the majority may 
also make it easier for patent holders to prevail on claims of 
inequitable conduct. Even leaving aside the arguably pro-patent 
holder language of the standards, the contraction of the pre-
Therasense materiality standards to two formal articulations will 
perhaps force district courts to more clearly communicate their 
reasoning and will limit their ability to pick the standard that best 
suits the outcome they would like to achieve.  
However, several considerations may be balanced against 
the view that Therasense will shift case outcomes in favor of 
patentees. The first is discussed at length in the earlier Part on 
Implications for Patent Litigation.79 The relevant points there are 
that Therasense has not eliminated patent acquisition misconduct 
doctrine, and may even have made it more complex and dangerous 
to patent practitioners. At the same time, Therasense might 
encourage prosecuting attorneys and agents to engage in riskier 
behavior. Indeed, professional obligations to clients might even 
require moving closer to the purportedly new line the court has 
drawn defining acceptable behavior. 
A second consideration is that inequitable conduct findings 
are already very rare.80 In order to substantially reduce such 
findings, Therasense probably would need to impose a standard so 
strict as to make a finding of inequitable conduct essentially 
impossible. For the reasons discussed above, it seems unlikely that 
Therasense has done so, and even Judge Rader’s opinion for the 
majority does not purport to go so far.   
A final consideration is whether the analytical framework 
prescribed by Therasense really compels a different result in any 
specific case. In other words, can one at least rest easy that 
Therasense will predictably filter patent acquisition misconduct 
claims so that in most cases the behavior involved is, at least on 
average, “worse” than behavior that has in the past supported 
claims of inequitable conduct? Or, instead, is the Therasense 
doctrine just as susceptible to being shaped to fit the normative 
views of judges as the previous doctrinal incarnation of inequitable 
conduct? Below, we set forth some reasons why patent 
practitioners should worry that the same kinds of behaviors that 
have supported inequitable conduct findings in the past can easily 
                                                
79 See supra Section II.C. 
80 See Petherbridge, et al., supra note 22, at 18-29; Inequitable Conduct: 2005-
2010, LEX MACHINA, https://lexmachina.com/reports/getfreereport (last visited 
June 17, 2011) (reporting 41 instances of inequitable conduct findings out of 
13,786 total patent cases during the period 2005-2010); cf. Mammen, supra note 
22, at 1354 (finding a trend of three to five inequitable conduct rulings a year for 
the prior four years to be abnormally high). 
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be made to fit the doctrine announced in Therasense should a 
district judge be so inclined.  
Of the majority’s holdings, its materiality framework 
represents the most dramatic departure from the past, requiring that 
the relevant conduct now pass a “but for” test. Yet that requirement 
contains an exception: for “affirmative egregious misconduct.” 
Although its contours have not yet been fully explored, that 
exception is perhaps so great that it swallows the whole. As the 
dissent notes, “it is often difficult to draw a line between 
nondisclosure and affirmative misrepresentation. . . . The 
distinction between ‘affirmative acts’ and ‘nondisclosure’ is thus 
apt to become fertile ground for litigation in the future, not to 
mention the distinction between ‘egregious’ misconduct and 
misconduct that is assertedly less than ‘egregious.’”81 
The court’s holding on the intent element is even more 
problematic in terms of mandating specific outcomes. On the 
relevant standard both the majority and dissent agreed: inequitable 
conduct requires specific intent to deceive the patent office. Rather 
than disagreeing about the applicable standard, the disagreement 
between the majority and dissent turns on a purely factual analysis: 
whether or not the relevant facts involved in this case, reviewed 
under a standard deferential to the District Court’s findings, satisfy 
that legal standard. Notably, nowhere in the dissent’s opinion does 
it take issue with the majority’s legal statements about the 
applicable standard for intent.  
What this dispute suggests to us is that the question of 
intent will continue to play a key role in the Federal Circuit’s 
review of inequitable conduct determinations,82 and the court will 
continue to be sharply divided on this issue. Nothing in the 
dissent’s opinion suggests that it views the legal pronouncements 
of the majority as limiting its ability to follow its normative views 
on whether or not particular conduct was intended to deceive the 
patent office.  
We also note that the dissent already has a powerful 
doctrinal tool should it choose to express its normative views. 
Within days of the Federal Circuit’s opinion in Therasense, the 
Supreme Court issued its opinion in Global-Tech v. SEB,83 a case 
dealing with the degree of scienter required for inducement of 
infringement. In Global-Tech, the Supreme Court concluded that 
knowledge for inducement can be established through “willful 
blindness”—a form of fault that appears to be novel to the patent 
                                                
81 Therasense, Inc. v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1314 n.3 (Fed. 
Cir. 2011). 
82 See Petherbridge, et al., supra note 222 (empirically analyzing the importance 
of the intent to deceive element of inequitable conduct doctrine).  
83 Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A.,131 S. Ct. 2060 (2011). 
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context. While the doctrine of inducement is distinct from that of 
inequitable conduct, commentators have already begun to 
recognize the applicability of willful blindness to inequitable 
conduct.84  
  Specifically, willful blindness allows for a finding of 
culpable knowledge if the accused party believes that there is a 
high probability that a fact exists and takes deliberate actions to 
avoid learning of the fact.85 Applying this mechanism, courts may 
be able to establish the elements of the Therasense “specific 
intent” test, knowledge of the relevant information and knowledge 
of its materiality, even in the absence of the high standard 
Therasense seems to require.  
This suggests that despite the majority’s attempt to limit the 
intent element of inequitable conduct through formal rules, judges 
will largely be free to apply their own normative perspectives, 
either because they consider any dispute to largely involve factual 
questions (as the dissent apparently did) or through the potential 
invocation of the concept of willful blindness.  
Accordingly, Therasense might produce the rather perverse 
result of encouraging or even requiring patent agents and attorneys 
to engage in riskier behavior, while at the same time failing to 
produce the doctrinal prophylaxis necessary to immunize the 
newly permitted conduct from the vagaries of a trial judge’s 
equitable discretion. If so, patent practice post-Therasense might 
hold many unpleasant surprises for patent practitioners.  
 
2. Will Therasense Solve the Problem of Applicant 
Overdisclosure? 
 
Far and away the biggest concern we heard from patent 
practitioners about the current law of inequitable conduct is that 
pre-Therasense inequitable conduct doctrine required that patent 
applicants make an expensive disclosure of art that, in their mind, 
would not be important to a reasonable examiner in deciding 
patentability.86 That disclosure occurs mostly in the context of 
information disclosure statement (IDS) practice, the aspect of 
patent prosecution that involves the use of a standardized 
document to disclose information such as lists of references, and 
sometimes references themselves, to the patent office. Thus the 
                                                
84 See Kevin E. Noonan, Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., PATENT 
DOCS (May 31, 2011), http://www.patentdocs.org/2011/06/global-tech-
appliances-inc-v-seb-sa-2011.html (noting the potential applicability of the 
concept of willful blindness to inequitable conduct).  
85 Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2070. 
86 This concern was also one raised repeatedly by many of the comments we 
received in response to an earlier draft of this Article. 
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disclosure concern sometimes goes by the label “IDS flooding,” or 
the “overdisclosure problem.”   
The idea of an overdisclosure problem is commonly based 
on a widely held belief that the harsh consequences, both to the 
patent attorney personally as well as for the client, of a potential 
finding of inequitable conduct force applicants to disclose every 
reference that has even the slightest relationship to the invention or 
patent application, including references that a reasonable examiner 
would not consider important in deciding whether to let the claims 
of an application issue as a patent.87 This putative behavior88—
overdisclosing out of fear of inequitable conduct law—presents a 
potential concern for patent quality, a concern that the court sought 
to address by its ruling in Therasense. The concern is that patent 
examiners faced with an information dump comprising large 
numbers of irrelevant or marginally relevant patents will have a 
costly time separating the wheat from the chaff. Information 
dumping, then, could result in the straining of concededly limited 
patent office resources and the burying of patentability-important 
information, thereby producing lower quality patents and perhaps 
causing examiners to ignore applicant-submitted art altogether.89  
The concern that pre-Therasense inequitable conduct 
doctrine required patent applicants to overdisclose was particularly 
highlighted in the opinion for the court.90 In fact, it is arguably the 
claim the court found most dispositive to the holding it announced 
in Therasense.91 As noted earlier, the Therasense majority 
responded to the bar’s plea for assistance by holding that in the 
                                                
87 See Cotropia, supra note 22, at 770-71. We recognize that pre-Therasense law 
did not require the disclosure references that a reasonable examiner would not 
consider important in deciding whether to let the claims of an application issue 
as a patent. We assume that patent practitioners—by virtue of being versed in 
patent law—also know this. Rather, the claim of the overdisclosure problem 
highlights a concern on the part of patent applicants that they needed to be more 
cautious than the law required in anticipation of the possibility of an 
unenforceability ruling in litigation. 
88 We characterize this as “putative” behavior for three reasons. First, while we 
have heard from some practitioners that they do this in certain circumstances, 
there is little empirical evidence concerning the extent of this practice in real 
life. Second, in briefing before the Federal Circuit, the patent bar and those who 
seek patents pressed the claim that this is common practice. Third, as we discuss 
later in this part, the notion that this practice is caused by pre-Therasense 
inequitable conduct law is not likely to provide a full explanation for why it 
occurs. 
89 See Cotropia et al., supra note 22 (empirically analyzing this phenomenon).  
90 The court’s opinion shows that the claim was convincingly pressed by amici. 
Therasense, Inc. v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 
2011) (citing the briefing of the United States and the Biotechnology Industry 
Organization as raising this specter of overdisclosure).  
91 Id. at 1289-90 (recognizing the issue as important to and supportive of the 
court’s modification of the inequitable conduct doctrine). 
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absence of affirmative egregious misconduct, patent applicants 
only need to disclose art that is “but for” material to patentability, 
viz. if an applicant fails to disclose prior art during the prosecution, 
“that prior art is but-for material if the PTO would not have 
allowed a claim had it been aware of the undisclosed prior art.”92 
The purpose of this change in the law is to reduce the range of 
information that a patent applicant is required to submit to the 
patent office. But will it really? In the analysis that follows, we 
suggest that the answer to the question may be “no,” and we 
explain why.  
In broad strokes, the answer has to do with (1) the nature of 
the change in the law and the patent law itself, and (2) the benefits 
to patent applicants of, in at least some cases, making massive 
indiscriminant disclosures of information.  
 
i.   The nature of the change in the law and the 
patent law itself 
 
Nothing in Therasense insulates an applicant who fails to 
disclose a key reference from a finding of inequitable conduct. At 
most, the rules in Therasense limit the category of potentially 
material information to the “but for” category. But given the dire 
consequences of a finding of inequitable conduct, there remains a 
strong incentive for applicants to continue to disclose everything 
they come across that might be relevant out of a fear that the art 
might be “but for” art.  
Patent law is too complex, unpredictable, and policy driven 
for applicants to know with certainty whether information is “but 
for” art. To determine patent validity, claims have to be 
construed—a legal process the outcome of which is not always 
predictable. Only after claims are construed can one even begin to 
compare the claimed invention to the prior art or the scope of the 
disclosure. Without an authoritative claim construction, there will 
be considerable disagreement over whether information is “but 
for” information.  
The situation is only slightly improved once an 
authoritative claim construction is established.93 The legal rules 
around obviousness, patentable subject matter, description and 
enablement, and even novelty are not so legally determinant that it 
is easy to predict what the patent office would do in light of 
particular pieces of information. Reasonable people will thus still 
often disagree about whether certain information might invalidate a 
patent claim. Accordingly, even if an applicant were to pay the 
                                                
92 Id. at 1291.  
93 Not the least reason being that the claim construction itself will often need to 
be interpreted.   
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cost of closely considering whether a prior art reference discloses 
“but for” information, in cases that are at all close there is always a 
probability that a court might later reach a different conclusion. 
Arguably, the path to safety is to go ahead and disclose the art in 
the first instance.  
Moreover, there is always the possibility that even if the 
applicant properly assesses the “but for” quality of a particular 
prior art reference at the time it is prosecuting the patent 
application, the law could change by the time the patent gets 
litigated. A first response to this concern is “so what?”: if the art is 
not material at the time of prosecution, it’s just not material and the 
applicant should have no worries. In addition, in all but the most 
marginal of cases it would seem impossible to conclude that an 
applicant had intent to deceive. Assuming the technical correctness 
of this response, however, its flaw is essentially that it is too 
technical a response. It is possible that a patentee might have a 
hard time showing the correctness of a decision made 10 or 15 
years earlier. The passage of time, the arguments available to make 
claims as to what the law “was,” and the talent vel non of litigation 
counsel are all risks patent practitioners face. Arguably, the path to 
safety is (again) to go ahead and disclose the art in the first 
instance. 
Finally, in addition to these theoretically developed 
concerns, we would be remiss in not emphasizing the empirical 
information we have gathered from actual patent practitioners. In 
response to an earlier draft of this Article, we received many 
comments from patent practitioners. In the comments that 
addressed this point, the overwhelming indication was that 
practitioners have no intention of changing their IDS practices and 
will continue to disclose large numbers of references when they 
feel it to be appropriate. 
 
ii. The benefits to patent applicants of current IDS 
practice 
 
It is common ground that patent applicants sometimes 
make large disclosures of information in the course of prosecuting 
patent applications.94 However, the true extent to which it happens 
                                                
94 It might be more likely to happen in particular kinds of circumstances: for 
example, a patent applicant who is prosecuting multiple related patents may 
decide to disclose every prior art document that is cited in any one of the 
applications in all of the proceedings. Adding another layer, if any one of those 
patents is involved in litigation, the applicant may choose to cite to the patent 
office every prior art reference asserted by the accused infringer in its defenses. 
Yet another layer is added if there are related foreign patent applications. The 
net result is patent applications containing hundreds of citations spanning 
multiple pages. 
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is an empirical question, about which there is surprisingly little 
empirical evidence95 given the court’s heavy reliance on the 
claim.96 The majority adopted the position that the problem was 
significant,97 an empirical guess that was put into sharp relief by 
the dissent and by the patent office’s apparent view (and perhaps 
equally a guess) that the concern was either not as significant as 
the majority claimed or at least manageable.98  
A comprehensive empirical investigation of the claim of 
IDS overdisclosure would be nice to have. But even without 
knowing how often massive disclosures happen, we think they 
should be expected in some cases. Patent applicants have economic 
incentives to sometimes make large IDS disclosures that go 
beyond a fear of inequitable conduct, including disclosures of art 
that would not be important to a reasonable examiner in deciding 
patentability.  
The practice of overdisclosing likely has the benefit to the 
applicant of being much less expensive than examining all of the 
known potentially relevant references and sorting that genus into 
species that would have been important to a reasonable examiner 
(or those that would be “but for” references) and those that would 
not have been important. By disclosing everything under the sun, a 
patent applicant can get protection from inequitable conduct and 
avoid a costly analysis of the significance of the various pieces of 
information that it submits. Moreover, applicants get a further 
benefit from this practice because it works to shift to the patent 
office more of the cost of determining what, if anything, in the 
disclosed information is important to patentability. As we noted 
earlier, it is common ground that patent office resources are 
already strained, and strategies that make the cost of patent 
examination higher for the patent office can be expected to 
                                                
95 The only empirical research on this issue of which we are aware is Dennis 
Crouch’s analysis of applicant disclosure rates from 2005-2010. Dennis Crouch, 
Cutting Back: Average Number of References Cited Per Patent, PATENTLY-O, 
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2010/07/my-entry.html (July 13, 2010, 10:23 
AM) (indicating an upward trend from 2005-2009, followed by a drop-off in 
2010). Furthermore, additional research by Professor Crouch suggests that the 
bulk of these references were submitted in only a small percentage of 
applications.  Dennis Crouch, References Cited, PATENTLY-O, 
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2009/02/references-cite.html (Feb. 19, 2009, 
12:34 PM) (noting that applicants submit over 200 references in just 2% of 
cases). 
96 Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1289. 
97 The majority used two examples to highlight this issue: a patent involving the 
submission of nine hundred references (cited by the Brief for the United States 
as Amicus Curiae) and one involving the submission of eighteen pages of cited 
references (cited by the Brief of the Biotechnology Industry Organization as 
Amicus Curiae). Id. 
98 Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1305 (Bryson, J., dissenting).  
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encourage marginally poorer examination, lower quality patents, 
and the spurious rejection of deserving applications.  
In fact, some empirical studies suggest this has been 
exactly the impact of large disclosures.99 Patent examiners may not 
pay attention to them, preferring instead to perform and rely on just 
their own search rather than taking on a costly analysis into the 
significance of the various pieces of information submitted by the 
applicant—many of which, according to applicants and Cotropia 
et. al., are not the sorts of things examiners will find important 
anyway.100  
A second reason why patent applicants might make large 
disclosures is that it works to create the impression, on paper at 
least, that the information submitted has been examined in 
connection with the patent that ultimately issues from the 
application. The perception, and probably the reality to at least a 
modest extent, is that the more art considered by the examiner, the 
stronger the patent (due to a presumption of administrative 
correctness). Thus, getting lots of information listed in the file 
history is helpful to a patent applicant because it makes the patent 
marginally more valuable.101  
*** 
Accordingly, an analysis of the potential impact of 
Therasense on practitioner concerns suggests that there are reasons 
to believe that the opinion will not substantially address the 
concerns that patent practitioners generally made and pressed in 
                                                
99 See Cotropia et al., supra note 22, at 25-27 (assessing the use by patent 
examiners of applicant-disclosed references and finding that examiners 
“regularly ignore…information submitted by the applicants themselves”).  
100 Id. at 22-27. 
101 We acknowledge that the overdisclosure problem is a viable concern, 
although one for which further empirical support would be beneficial. Even 
assuming there is a significant concern, however, we are unpersuaded at the 
present time that Therasense provides a solution. Thus, while the primary 
purpose of this Article is to analyze the court’s opinion, we nevertheless take a 
moment to suggest a modest proposal in connection with this issue. Based on 
our experience and our interaction with practitioners, it appears that the sorts of 
documents most involved in IDS flooding could be U.S. patents and U.S. patent 
applications. One possible solution to the overdisclosure problem would be to 
adopt a general presumption that all U.S. patents and patent applications are 
before the patent examiner, and unless extraordinary (and perhaps particular) 
circumstances exist, the failure to disclose such documents cannot be the basis 
for a finding of inequitable conduct. A rule such as this has the merit of being a 
fairly bright line rule; it targets what we believe may be the most pernicious 
class of documents involved in IDS flooding; and it allows private parties to 
shift resources toward a focus on nonpatent prior art that the patent office and 
competitors without the patent applicant’s disclosures may be unlikely to 
discover. Obviously, this footnote provides only the roughest of sketches, and 
the idea presented here should receive further examination and analysis before it 
is taken too seriously.  
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connection with the en banc case. It may be reasonable to expect a 
similar number of successful claims of patent acquisition 
misconduct, and patent applicants’ incentive to overdisclose may 
not be at all affected by the court’s holding. 
 
E.  What Does It All Mean? 
 
The short answer is that it depends. And the more complete 
answer lies ultimately in the marginal impact of the decision on the 
issues we raise in Parts II. A, B, C, and D. There is obviously some 
amount of tension between the interpretation that if Therasense has 
the impact the majority hopes for then patent quality will suffer 
and the interpretation that Therasense may not have the impact that 
the majority hopes for because of its impact on patent acquisition 
misconduct doctrines and its lack of impact on the reasons why 
patent applicants sometimes overdisclose information. The 
important point of the analysis in this Part is that these two 
analytical interpretations are not logical opposites, nor is their 
relationship a simple, inverse one. It is not, we suggest, the case 
that if there is no reduction in overdisclosure and no reduction in 
findings of patent acquisition misconduct, then Therasense will 
have no impact on patent quality, no impact on the incentive 
structure of the patent system, and no impact on patent 
practitioners. Below, we approach the explanation from two polar 
perspectives, first considering the consequences if the court is 
entirely right, and then turning to examine what it means if the 
court is entirely wrong—recognizing that the likely answer 
actually lies somewhere between the two poles.  
If the court is entirely right and its opinion has perfected a 
rent shift from the public and the patent office to the patent bar and 
those who seek patents, then one might expect an alleviation of 
some practitioner concerns about the risks and consequences of 
inequitable conduct. The expected tradeoffs—again, assuming one 
does not believe that private resources now retained by patent 
applicants were not before Therasense mostly wasted—are several. 
Patent examination will be marginally less efficient in the sense 
that information useful to it will no longer be provided by the 
cheapest cost providers of the information. Some information will 
instead come from more expensive cost providers or will not be 
provided to the patent creation process at all. Patent examination 
might thus be expected to be more poorly performed. It follows 
that patent quality might marginally decrease from spurious 
allowances. In addition, the incentive structure of the patent system 
may additionally be damaged by the spurious rejection of 
deserving applications. Moreover, as we have demonstrated, the 
burden of litigation to the patent system could well be enhanced by 
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the court’s decision in Therasense.  
On the other hand, even if the majority is entirely wrong 
and the court’s efforts to encourage practitioners to disclose much 
less and to insulate practitioners from claims of inequitable 
conduct fail, all of the above concerns are unfortunately not 
completely reversed. The pre-Therasense status quo does not 
necessarily return.  
To begin with, as we have demonstrated, the new patent 
acquisition misconduct doctrines seem very difficult to predict. At 
a minimum, substantial litigation will be required to establish a 
new doctrinal equilibrium. Thus, the new misconduct doctrines 
could still substantially aggravate the systemic cost of patent 
litigation. There is an additional concern that by defining a new 
line for acceptable behavior, the court may be encouraging, and, in 
combination with general rules of professional ethics, perhaps 
requiring patent attorneys and agents to engage in riskier behavior. 
This incentive will be perverse in view of misconduct doctrine that 
fails to have the prophylactic benefits the bar seems currently to 
expect from Therasense.  
Finally, while the court’s efforts to limit the information 
patentees disclose to the patent office in IDSs may fail, it is 
possible that the court’s decision may be still be felt on that point. 
Unfortunately, it is possible that the court’s opinion may be used to 
justify the nondisclosure of information about which the patent 
office and potential competitors are highly unlikely to learn. To be 
clear, we believe that patent applicants—or their agents—as a 
group do not want to engage in misconduct. But as we have shown, 
patent applicants may be strongly encouraged, or even required, to 
make nondisclosure decisions because of the court’s new 
materiality standard. In addition, taking the “but for” standard in 
view of the vagaries of the patent law, it is probably indisputable 
that patent practitioners will have more “moral leeway” after 
Therasense in deciding not to disclose. Thus, it is possible that one 
of the enduring legacies of Therasense is that patent practitioners 
will struggle even more with competing duties and powers: they 
may face a stronger professional duty to come up with rationales 
for why information is not “but for” material and thus need not be 
disclosed, while at the same time, they have been given greater 
discretion to unilaterally determine the statutory requirements for 
patentability. Keeping in mind that patents are very rarely litigated, 
which might already present something of a moral hazard, these 
competing principles could present serious problems for 
practitioners and the patent system. Moreover, one might expect 
that the incentives are at their worst when there is a perception of a 
low likelihood of discovery, namely when the disclosure decisions 
involve art or information that no one else is likely to find.  
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Therasense might thus end up accentuating the system’s 
negative aspects while providing little to no positive systemic 
benefits.  
 
III.     A GLIMPSE OF THE NEW FEDERAL CIRCUIT? 
 
The Federal Circuit has recently seen many judges of long 
tenure move to senior status or leave the court entirely, and the last 
few years have seen the appointment of several new circuit 
judges.102 There is a general expectation that with such substantial 
change in active membership, the complexion of the court is likely 
to change. Therasense provides, perhaps, our first glimpse at the 
new Federal Circuit. In particular, we note the important role that 
the three newest appointees to the court played in the outcome: 
both Judges Moore and Reyna joined with the majority opinion, 
and Judge O’Malley concurred with its result. With the court so 
closely divided on the issue of inequitable conduct, the addition of 
these judges to the mix may have produced a completely different 
result than would have been the case even a year ago.  
As we have throughout this Article, we raise issues 
specifically implicated by the majority’s opinion in the Therasense 
case. It is especially important to keep this limitation in mind in 
this Part as we base our analysis on the anecdote of a single 
opinion, and, at that, not even one signed by all of the judges,103 to 
make some observations about what the new generation of the 
Federal Circuit might look like.  
 
1. An Ex Post, not an Ex Ante Patent System 
 
For years, Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Federal 
Circuit have developed patent jurisprudence based on the 
conception that the patent system is a property rights-based system. 
The policies implicated by the concept include an emphasis on 
voluntary transactions around patent rights, with litigation being 
the exception. In short, the patent system is supposed to promote 
                                                
102 In the four years preceding Therasense, four judges (Judges Haldane Mayer, 
Raymond Clevenger, III, Alvin Schall and Paul Michel) (roughly a third of the 
court) have taken senior status or left the court entirely, while three new judges 
(Judges Kimberly Moore, Kathleen O’Malley, and Jimmie Reyna) have been 
appointed. Since Therasense was decided, an additional judge (Judge Arthur 
Gajarsa) has taken senior status and Congress has appointed one more new 
judge (Judge Evan Wallach). 
103 To this point, it should be clear that while we paint with a broad brush—as is 
appropriate in talking about an opinion for the court—it must be acknowledged 
that at least four of the court’s judges specifically rejected the majority’s 
decision, and even if that were not true, our observations cannot be applied to 
any of the court’s judges individually.  
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the allocation of resources through markets, not through federal 
district court judges. Crucial to this concept is the ability of market 
participants to transact ex ante—before litigation. As the Supreme 
Court bluntly put it almost fifty years ago, “[t]o await litigation 
is—for all practical purposes—to debilitate the patent system.”104  
The Therasense decision suggests the possibility that the 
new Federal Circuit might be willing to abandon these core 
principles in favor of a system that is, at least marginally, more of 
an ex post system—one where more transactions happen after (or 
through) litigation. In other words, Therasense may foreshadow a 
patent system in which litigation will become more important and 
ex ante negotiation, licensing, and contracting less so. This is 
possible because, as we have speculated in the previous Parts, the 
direction of the change in the law produced by Therasense is to 
make patents cheaper and easier to get. Moreover, it is probable 
that the patent office will be forced to determine patentability in 
view of even less information about whether the invention should 
be patented than the patent office utilized before Therasense. If 
this eventuality is realized, it suggests that patentees will own more 
patents that could be found invalid by a district court judge. In 
other words, the first real patent examination would occur at the 
patent infringement stage, not at the patent application stage. 
Logically, this could lead to greater ex ante uncertainty around 
patent rights and raise the cost of negotiation to the point that it is 
cheaper to negotiate using litigation. If so, the result may be more 
patent allocation decisions being made by federal district court 
judges rather than by private parties transacting in the 
marketplace.105   
 
2. A More Political Federal Circuit?  
 
The opinion for the majority in Therasense has the flavor of 
an announcement as opposed to a detailed analysis of the relevant 
public policy. And since it is an announcement that at least facially 
favors perhaps the court’s most influential constituencies—the 
patent bar and those who seek patents—it raises the specter that the 
new Federal Circuit might be substantially more political than the 
old one.  
From the majority’s opinion, it seems evident that the 
patent bar and those who seek patents strongly desired the holding; 
the opinion contains several pages of citations to the concerns of 
the patent bar, which it clearly finds relevant—if not 
                                                
104 Graham v. John Deere of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 18 (1966). 
105 This analysis leaves aside the concern that Therasense might in time spawn a 
cottage industry of patent acquisition misconduct litigation. If that also happens, 
it should be expected to push even further in the direction of an ex post system.  
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determinative—to its decision to raise the standard for establishing 
inequitable conduct.106 The bar’s actual concerns were, however, 
rather vague, essentially amounting to unsubstantiated empirical 
claims about the patent acquisition and patent litigation burdens of 
inequitable conduct.107 The litigation burden claim has become 
even more questionable since the Federal Circuit heard the case, 
and the patent office, the institution the bar claimed needed to be 
protected from the overdisclosure of information relating to the 
patentability of inventions, downplayed the concern in its own 
brief.108 In fact, the patent office asked not to be relieved of the 
information patent applicants were required to submit.109 It 
expressed the concern that it would be unable to perform quality 
patent examination unless it could get information from applicants 
beyond that which would be just “but for” patent defeating.110  
Thus, it is somewhat discouraging that, other than some 
conclusory statements to the effect that the public will benefit from 
its decision (mostly, it appears, on the predictions that (1) less will 
be spent litigating inequitable conduct, and (2) patents will cost 
less to obtain), the majority opinion in Therasense offers almost no 
analysis of the issues involved from the perspective of the 
public.111 This stands in sharp contrast to the dissent, which 
provides a much deeper analysis of the policy issues implicated by 
the law of inequitable conduct and analyzes the issues with a focus 
on the public consequences of the decision.112  
So perhaps, just perhaps, we are seeing a more political 
Federal Circuit emerging. Perhaps the old court is giving way to a 
new court that seeks to be more “in tune” with the constituencies 
affected by its decisions. In administrative law lingo, perhaps we 
are seeing the receding of a public interest Federal Circuit and the 
emergence of a public choice Federal Circuit.  
 
3. A Pro-Patentee Federal Circuit?  
 
Therasense seems to be a remarkably pro-patentee opinion, 
as distinguished, perhaps, from a pro-patent system opinion. The 
rationale for this interpretation has already been discussed in the 
earlier Parts of this Article. However, it is difficult to speculate 
about how generalizable a pro-patentee interpretation might be. It 
                                                
106 See Therasense, Inc. v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1288-90 
(Fed. Cir. 2011). 
107 Id. at 1288. 
108 Id. at 1305-06 (Bryson, J., dissenting). 
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
111 See, e.g., id.at 1290 (majority opinion).  
112 We are not suggesting that the dissent is necessarily correct; only that its 
opinion contains substantially more rigorous analysis than the majority opinion. 
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might easily be the case that this opinion is something of a one-off, 
and that the Federal Circuit is not at all moving in a pro-patentee 
direction. In addition, it must be noted that if our predictions in the 
preceding Parts turn out to be correct, the eventual result of 
Therasense might be perverse to the interest of patentees. They 
could actually be worse off in the future than they were before 
Therasense due to increased uncertainty about whether their patent 
rights are enforceable and, potentially, a diminished public opinion 
about the patent system.  
 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this brief Article has been to provide an early 
analysis of some of the most substantial law and policy concerns 
raised by the very recent en banc decision of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in the Therasense v. 
Becton Dickinson case. Using theoretical logic and policy analysis, 
we have identified substantial law and policy concerns that are 
raised by the court’s decision but that were left largely unaddressed 
by the court’s analysis. Our Article does not show that the “sky 
will fall” or that the court’s opinion in Therasense will “destroy the 
patent system.” To the contrary, we think the Article teaches that 
the impact of the Therasense decision can only be properly 
analyzed with an appreciation of the many and complex 
interactions involved in the patent creation and patent litigation 
environments.  
On the court’s side of the ledger can be placed the benefits it 
predicts for its approach; namely, that it is might be the case that 
Therasense will make patents cheaper to obtain and cheaper to 
enforce. This Article’s contribution is to begin a discussion of what 
may be counted on the other side of the ledger. We identify a 
number of possible costs to the court’s approach: inter alia, a 
higher cost in bringing information to bear on the patentability 
determination; a potential decrease in the quality of information 
brought to bear on the patentability determination; a potential 
increase in the number of low-quality patents; and the potential 
reputational and economic costs to the patent system of a 
misconduct doctrine that might be more complex and dangerous to 
patent applicants and the patent system than the one it replaced.  
From that perspective, our analysis suggests that the opinion 
for the court might be too optimistic in its expectation that a simple 
and straight line can be drawn from making patents cheaper to 
obtain and cheaper to enforce to an increased public, and for that 
matter patentee, benefit. That said, it will take time and additional 
analysis to determine if, at the end of the day, the court’s efforts to 
reduce the risk of inequitable conduct to patent applicants will 
provide a benefit to the patent system that outweighs the costs.  
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